The collapse of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs and the unprecedented refund process now underway represent a fundamental pivot point in how tariffs are imposed, challenged, unwound, and ultimately replaced. For importers, manufacturers, and policymakers, the current times call for more than compliance; they require strategic reassessment.
There are questions surrounding not only the refund process, but also surrounding the bigger questions now facing the trade community: what happens now that the Supreme Court has struck down the IEEPA tariffs, how durable are recent policy trends, and how should companies adapt when legal authorities change but tariff pressure endures?
I. The IEEPA Tariffs Refund Process: Relief with Caveats
The IEEPA tariffs refund process that launched on April 20, 2026, is extraordinary in scope — approximately $170 billion in duties, plus interest, across more than 53 million entries and more than 330,000 importers. That scale alone raises important questions about administrative capacity, accuracy of data, and procedural fairness.
Although the Court of International Trade (CIT) has asserted exclusive authority and directed Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to liquidate or reliquidate all affected entries without regard to the duties, the process is not automatic. Importers must actively identify affected entries, validate CBP’s calculations, and submit claims through the newly launched Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries (CAPE) portal. Phase 1 eligibility is strictly limited, excluding entries beyond the 80‑day post‑liquidation window as well as those subject to reconciliation, drawback claims, AD/CVD, or final liquidation.
II. Protests, Preservation, and Litigation Strategy
For entries falling outside CAPE Phase 1, importers should resort to more traditional tools: protests and litigation. This approach highlights a broader reality — refund eligibility increasingly depends on procedural vigilance rather than substantive entitlement.
The looming statute of limitations deadlines extend well into 2027, forcing companies to decide whether to wait on administrative processes or proactively litigate. This choice implicates cost, uncertainty, and leverage.
There is still the prospect that the Government might try to appeal the CIT’s order with respect to finally liquidated entries and other entries that are not subject to CAPE Phase 1.
III. “Refunds” Do Not Mean Tariffs Are Going Away
Perhaps the most consequential insight from the IEEPA saga is what followed its demise: tariffs did not leave for good. Rather, importers should continue to expect that elevated tariff levels are the new normal.
Section 232 and 301 tariffs have survived judicial scrutiny, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has upheld challenges to both. The Supreme Court did not take up the Section 232 case and is still considering whether to take the Section 301 case.
Section 232 tariffs have recently expanded dramatically to cover:
- Automobiles and parts,
- Medium- and heavy-duty vehicles and parts,
- Buses,
- Advanced semiconductors,
- Copper articles,
- Softwood timber,
- Lumber,
- Kitchen cabinets,
- Wooden vanities,
- Upholstered wooden furniture, and
- A vast array of aluminum and steel articles and derivatives.
New Presidential Proclamations on April 2, 2026, completely reworked the framework for aluminum, steel, and copper tariffs and imposed new upcoming tariffs on pharmaceuticals.

The Administration is also conducting investigations that could result in new Section 232 tariffs on:
- Commercial aircraft, jet engines, and parts;
- Personal protective equipment (PPE),
- Medical consumables, devices, and equipment;
- Polysilicon and derivatives;
- Drones, parts, and components;
- Wind turbines, parts, and components; and
- Robotics and industrial machinery.
The latter is potentially the most frightening prospect for businesses. As most manufacturing equipment is imported, significant tariffs on robotics and industrial machinery could stymy the Government’s professed goal of promoting U.S. production.
At the same time, the Administration has signaled that Section 301 investigations will replace the former IEEPA tariff framework by July 25. These investigations are being fast-tracked, and they are wide-ranging, covering 60 major trade partners (including the European Union) and potentially all sectors simultaneously.
IV. Risk Mitigation
Companies should plan for the likelihood that the investigations mentioned above will lead to significant tariffs and address vulnerabilities in their supply chains accordingly.
Accurate reporting of classification, valuation, and country of origin is more important than ever. Heightened enforcement, including the implementation of a joint Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security Trade Fraud Task Force, means that seemingly technical errors in such reporting can carry heavy consequences. Importers are ultimately liable for any errors; they cannot simply rely on their customs brokers.
Companies can seek to mitigate the risks of elevated tariffs by sourcing from the United States or countries with lower tariff levels, including U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement-compliant products, as well as taking advantage of Foreign Trade Zones (FTZs), Temporary Importation under Bond (TIB), and duty drawback where applicable.
Beyond those defensive strategies, some companies are also going on offense by seeking higher tariff rates for their competitors, including through antidumping and countervailing and duty proceedings.
V. Looking Forward
The invalidation of the IEEPA tariffs exposed a system increasingly comfortable with aggressive trade tools, layered authorities, and post hoc correction through refunds. For companies, the challenge is not simply navigating one refund process, but adapting to a future where tariffs are imposed quickly, litigated later, and replaced rather than repealed.
VI. What Companies Should Be Doing Now
Companies can no longer treat tariffs as temporary disruptions or short‑term cost anomalies. Instead, tariff exposure must be continuously assessed as part of enterprise‑wide risk management. This includes considering multiple tariff scenarios, reassessing sourcing decisions with an eye toward geopolitical rather than purely economic risk and ensuring that contracts expressly address the allocation of tariff liability and the treatment of any future refunds.
Equally important is internal governance. Many organizations still lack centralized review of trade compliance, relying heavily on customs brokers for execution. In a world where refund rights can rely on procedural deadlines and documentation quality, that disconnect creates real exposure.
Finally, tariffs, potential refunds, and contingent liabilities increasingly affect financial forecasting and disclosures. The post‑IEEPA environment highlights that trade policy risk is a recurring and material factor to consider in global business planning.
